

Def. Doc. No. 1015

Excerpt from "Red star over China".

P. 305 line 7 - P. 306 line 10

Edgar Snow was born at Kansas City, Missouri in July, 1905. He is of Irish and English lineage. In his boyhood, it is said that he worked as a farmer, and as an oiler, and also learned printing. From 1923 to 1924 he studied at the Junior College at Kansas City, from 1925 to 1926 at Missouri University and in 1927 at Columbia University (Extension). His first step as a pressman was taken at the Kansas City Star, and his varied activities as a Far East correspondent began after a period as the assistant editor of the China Weekly Review. After 1930, he visited the Eastern Three Provinces of China, Mongolia, Japan, Korea, Formosa, Dutch Indies, Burma and India as well as China proper. Namely, in 1930, he toured the Southwest provinces of China for a long period, then visited West Yunnan and Burma, where he experienced riots. Then he entered India from Burma, and interviewed the leaders of the Indian revolution. At the outbreak of the Sept. 10 Incident, he returned to China, investigated the conditions of the Japanese aggression against China, and sent a great deal of information regarding the Shanghai Incident of 1932, and of the Jehol Incident of 1933 to American and English papers from the actual spot.

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University, but the course in his charge is not known.

His activities, since then, are as described in this book. In June 1936, he entered into Soviet Territory, north of the Shensi province, for the first time as a foreigner, and after repeated inspections and investigations, returned to Peiping.

At the time of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, he was in Peiping but immediately moved to Shanghai to continue his activities as correspondent. (As to details, during this time, refer to his book "Strife for Asia"). Then he went to Hankow, Woochow and Chungking, as a result of which journey he published his book "Strife for Asia".

In the same year, he returned to the States, and during World War II visited the U.S.S.R., the details of which are communicated to us through his book "Forms of Influences of the Soviet".

BASIC COMMUNIST POLICIES

P. 107 like - P. 107 1927 same

What are the fundamental policies of the Chinese Reds today? I had a dozen or more talks on this subject with Mao Tse-tung and other leading Communists. But before we examine these policies it is necessary to have some conception of the nature of the long struggle between the Communists and Yankins. If we are to comprehend even the recent events in the Reddening North-west, we must first look at a few facts of history.

In the following paragraphs I paraphrase, in part, the comments of Lo Fu, the young American-educated secretary of the Communist Central Committee, whom I interviewed in Pao An. It likely to be heavy going, but I believe it will prove worth while.

As is well known, the Chinese Communist Party began only in 1921. It grew very rapidly till 1923, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party), made his famous entente with Soviet Russia. Neither the Kuomintang nor the Kungch'antang (Communist Party) had power, and both claimed to be struggling to establish democracy. It was easy to reach an understanding. In 1924, the Kuomintang was reorganized with the help of Russian advisers, along lines of the party of Lenin. An alliance was formed with the Chinese Communist Party, and Communists became very active in leading and organizing the Great Revolution of 1925-1927, which finally overthrew the corrupt Peking dictatorship.

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Now the basis of this co-operation, as far as the Communists were concerned, can be summarized as the acceptance by Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang of two major revolutionary principles. The first recognized the necessity of an anti-imperialist policy--the recovery of complete political, territorial and economic sovereignty by revolutionary action. The second demanded an internal policy of anti-feudalism and anti-militarism--the realization of a democratic revolution against the landlords and warlords, and the construction of new forms of social, economic and political life, which both the Communists and the Kuomintang agreed must be democratic in character.

The Communists, of course, regarded the successful fulfillment of the "bourgeois-democratic" revolution as a necessary preliminary for any Socialist society which might later be established, so their position was logical in supporting a "democratic national independence and liberation" movement.

Unfortunately, Dr. Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, before the revolution was completed. Co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Kungch'antang came to an end in 1927. From the Communist viewpoint, the Nationalist Revolution may also be said to have ended then. The right wing of the Kuomintang, dominated by the new militarism, and supported by certain foreign powers, the treaty-port bankers, and the landlords, broke away from the legally elected Government at Hankow. It formed a régime at Nanking under Chiang Kai-shek which the Communists and the majority of the Kuomintang at that time regarded as "counter-revolutionary"; that is, against the "bourgeois-democratic revolution" itself.

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The Kuomintang soon reconciled itself to the Nanking coup d'état, but Communism became a crime punishable by death that the Reds conceived to be the two main points of Nationalism--the anti-imperialist movement and the democratic revolution--were practice abandoned. Militarists' civil wars and, later, intensive war against the rising agrarian revolution ensued. Many thousands of Communists and former peasant-union and labor leaders were killed. The unions were suppressed. An "enlightened dictatorship" made war on all forms of opposition. Even so, quite a number of Communists survived in the Army, and the Party held together throughout a period of great terrorism. In 1937, despite the expenditure of billions of dollars in civil war against them, the Red armies occupied in the North-west the biggest single connected territory ever under their complete control.

Of course the Reds believe that the decade of history since 1927 has richly validated their thesis that national independence and democracy (which the Kuomintang also set as its objective) cannot be achieved in China without an anti-imperialist policy externally, and an agrarian revolution internally.

Mao Tse-tung, as secretary of the Peasants' Committee of the Kuomintang in 1926 (before the break with the Communists, when Mao was candidate to the Central Executive Committee of Kuomintang), supervised the collection of land statistics for areas in twenty-one provinces. He asserts that this investigation indicated that resident landlords, rich peasants, officials, absentee landlords and usurers, about 10 per cent of the whole rural population, together owned over 70 per cent of the cultivatable land in China. About 15 per cent was owned by middle peasants. But over 65 per cent of the rural population, made up of poor peasants, tenants and farm workers, owned only from 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the total arable land.

"These statistics were suppressed after the counter-revolution according to Mao. "Now, ten years later, it is still impossible to get any statement from Nanking on land distribution in China."

The Communists think that rural bankruptcy has been accelerated by the disastrous consequences of abandoning the anti-imperialist struggle, which to most Chinese today means the "anti-Japanese struggle."

P. 111 line 10 - P. 112 line 5

Of course Nanking could not stop civil war as long as the Reds continued to attempt to overthrow the Government by force. But as early as 1932 the Reds had proposed peace, and offered to unite with Nanking, on a common program of resistance to Japan. Their proposals had been rejected. Now, once more, despite the great strategic advantages which the Red Army enjoyed in its developing position in the North-west, the Communist Party, in collaboration

With anti-Japanese armies and patriotic associations throughout China, had renewed its offers to co-operate to end civil war and create a national "anti-Japanese front" against the aggressor. It promised to submit its Red Army and its Soviet districts to the complete authority of the Central Government provided the Nanking would agree to establish democratic representative government, resist Japan, enfranchise the people, and guarantee civil liberties to the masses. In other words, the Reds were ready to "remarry" the Kuomintang if it would return to the "Bourgeois-nationalist" programme of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. But of these two basic aims they realized that the fight for national survival was paramount, and must be conducted even at the expense of abandoning the internal struggle over the land question that class antagonisms might have to be sublimated in, certainly could not be satisfied without, the successful solution of the external antagonism with Japan.

P. 114 lines 4 - last line

I asked Mao whether the Soviets were in favour of cancelling unequal treaties. He pointed out that many of these unequal treaties have, in effect, already been destroyed by the Japanese, especially in the case of Manchuria. But as for the future attitude of a representative Government in China, he declared:

"These powers that help or do not oppose China in her war of independence and liberation should be invited to enjoy close friendly relations with China. Those powers which actively assist Japan should naturally not be given the same treatment: for example, Germany and Italy, which have already established special relations with Manchukuo, and cannot be regarded as powers friendly to the

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Chinese people.

"With friendly powers, China will peacefully negotiate treaties of mutual advantage. With other powers China is prepared to maintain co-operation on a much broader scale....So far as Japan is concerned, China must by the act of war of liberation cancel all unequal treaties, confiscate all Japanese imperialist holdings, and annul Japan's special privileges, concessions, and influence in this country. Concerning our relations with other powers, we Communists do not advocate any measure that may place at disadvantage the world position of China in her struggle against Japanese imperialism.

3
On war with Japan

P.117 line 13 - P.118 line 7

Mao began to answer my first question, about Communist policy towards Japan, which was this: "If Japan is defeated and driven from China, do you think that the major problem of 'foreign imperialism' will in general have been solved here?"

"Yes. If other imperialist countries do not act as Japan, or if China defeats Japan, it will mean that the Chinese masses have awakened, have mobilized, and have established their independence. Therefore the main problem of imperialism will have been solved."

"Under what conditions do you think the Chinese people can defeat and exhaust the forces of Japan?" I asked.

He replied: "Three conditions will guarantee our success: first, the achievement of the National United Front against Japanese imperialism in China; second, the formation of a World Anti-Japanese United Front; third, revolutionary action by the oppressed peoples at present suffering under Japanese imperialism. Of these, the central necessity is the union of the Chinese people themselves."

P.124 line 8 - P.125 line 9

Question: "How can the people best be armed, organized and trained to participate in such a war?"

Answer: "The people must be given the right to organize and to arm themselves. This is a freedom which Chiang Kai-shek has in the past denied to them. The suppression has not, however, been entirely successful--as, for example, in the case of the Red Army.

Also, despite severe repression in Peiping, in Shanghai and other places, the students have begun to organize themselves and have already prepared themselves politically. But still the students and the revolutionary anti-Japanese masses have not yet got their freedom, cannot be mobilized, cannot be trained and armed. When the contrary is true, when the masses are given economic, social and political freedom, their strength will be intensified hundreds of times, and the true power of the nation will be revealed.

"The Red Army through its own struggle has won its freedom from the militarists to become an unconquerable power. The anti-Japanese volunteers have won their freedom of action from the Japanese oppressors and have armed themselves in a similar way. If the Chinese people are trained, armed and organized they can likewise become an invincible force."

Question: "What, in your opinion, should be the main strategy and tactics to be followed in this 'war of liberation'?"

Answer: "The strategy should be that of a war of manoeuvre, over an extended, shifting and indefinite front: a strategy depending for success on a high degree of mobility in difficult terrain, and featured by swift attack and withdrawal, swift concentration and dispersal. It will be a large-scale war of manoeuvre rather than the simple positional war of extensive trench-work, deep-massed lines and heavy fortifications. Our strategy and tactics must be conditioned by the theatre in which the war will take place, and this dictates a war of manoeuvre."

"This does not mean the abandonment of vital strategic points, which can be defended in positional warfare as long as profitable. But the pivotal strategy must be a war of manoeuvre, and important reliance must be placed on guerilla and partisan tactics. Fortified warfare must be utilized, but it will be of auxiliary and secondary strategic importance."

P. 126 line 13 - P. 127 line 3

"Besides the regular Chinese troops we should create, direct, and politically and militarily equip great numbers of partisan and guerilla detachments among the peasantry. What has been accomplished by the anti-Japanese volunteer units of this type in Manchuria is only a very minor demonstration of the latent power of resistance that can be mobilized from the revolutionary peasantry of all China. Properly led and organized, such units can keep the Japanese busy twenty-four hours a day and worry them to death.

"It must be remembered that the war will be fought in China. This means that the Japanese will be entirely surrounded by a hostile Chinese people. The Japanese will be forced to move in all their provisions and guard them, maintaining troops along all lines of communications, and heavily garrisoning their bases in Manchuria and Japan as well.

P. 134 line 13 - P. 135 line 1

The curriculum varied in different sections of Hung Ta, but the diet of cadets in the First Section may be taken as sample form. Political lectures included these courses: Political Knowledge

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Problems of the Chinese Revolution, Political Economy, Early Construction, Tactical Problems of the Republic, Leninism and Historical Foundations of Democracy, and Political and Social Forces in Japan. Military courses included: Problems of Strategy in the War with Japan, Manoeuvring Warfare (against Japan), and the Development of Partisan Warfare in the Anti-Japanese War.

Special text-book had been prepared for some of these courses. Some were carried clear from the Soviet publishing house in Kiangsi, where (I was told) more than eight hundred printers were employed in the main plant. In other courses the materials used were lectures by Red Army commanders and party leaders, dealing with historical experiences of the Russian and the Chinese revolutions, or utilizing material from captured Government files, documents and statistics.

These courses of Hung Ta perhaps suggest a reply to the question, "Do the Reds really intend to fight Japan?" It suffices to show how the Reds foresee and actively plan for China's "war of independence" against Japan--a war which they regard as inevitable unless, by some miracle, Japan withdraws from the vast areas of China now under the wheels of Nippon's military juggernaut.

Red Theatre

P. 136 line 6 - line 8

People were already moving down towards the open-air stage, improvised from an old temple, when I set out with the young official who had invited me to the Red Theatre. It was Saturday, two or three hours before sunset, and all Pao An seemed to be going

P. 137 line 2 - line 8

Across the stage was a big pink curtain of silk, with the words, "People's Anti-Japanese Dramatic Society," in Chinese characters, as well as Latinized Chinese, which the Reds were promoting to hasten mass education. The programme was to last three hours. It proved to be a combination of playlets, dancing, singing and pantomime--a kind of variety show, or vaudeville, given unity chiefly by two central themes: anti-Japanese and the revolution. It was full of overt propaganda, wholly unsophisticated, and the "props" were primitive. But it had the advantage of being emancipated from cymbal-crashing and falsetto-singing, and of dealing with living material rather than with meaningless historical intrigues that are the concern of the decadent Chinese opera.

P. 137 line 15 - P. 139 line 2

The first playlet here was called Invasion. It opens in a Manchurian village, in 1931, with the Japanese arriving and driving out the "non-resisting" Chinese soldiers. In the second scene, Japanese officers banquet in a peasant's home, using Chinese men for chairs, and drunkenly making love to their wives. Another scene

shows Japanese dope pedlars selling morphine and heroin and forcing every peasant to buy a quantity. A youth who refuses to buy is singled out for questioning.

"You don't buy morphine, you don't obey Manchurian health rules, you don't love your 'divine' Emperor Pu Yi," charge his tormentors. "You are no good, you are an anti-Japanese boy!" And the youth is promptly executed.

A scene in the village market-place shows small merchants peacefully selling their wares. Suddenly Japanese soldiers arrive searching for more "anti-Japanese bandits." Instantly they demand passports, and those who have forgotten them are shot. Then two Japanese officers gorge themselves on a pedlar's pork. When he asks for payment they look at him in astonishment. "You ask for payment? Why, Chiang Kai-shek gave us Manchuria, Jehol, Chahar, the Tangku Truce, the Ho-Hotso Agreement, and the Hopei-Chahar Council, without asking a single copper! And you want us to pay for a little pork!" Whereupon, they slap him as a "bandit."

In the end, of course, all this proves too much for the villagers. Merchants turn over their stands and umbrellas, farmers rush forth with their spears, women and children come with their knives, and all swear to "fight to the death" against the Wuh-pen-kuei--the "Japanese devils."

The little play was sprinkled with humour and local idiom. Bursts of laughter alternated with oaths of disgust and hatred for the Japanese. The audience got quite excited. It was not just

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political propaganda to them, nor slapstick melodrama, but the poignant truth itself. The fact that the players were mostly youths in their teens and natives of Shensi and Shansi seemed entirely forgotten in the onlookers' absorption with the ideas presented.

⁴
Anatomy of Money

P. 287 line 5 - line 8

Paper currency in the South, bearing the signature of the "Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government State Bank," was excellently printed, on good bank paper. In the North-west, technical deficiencies resulted in a much cruder issue on poor paper, and sometimes on cloth. Their slogans appeared on all money. Notes issued in Shensi bore such exhortations as these: "Stop civil war!" "Unite to resist Japan!" "Long live the Chinese revolution!"

Soviet money was accepted nearly everywhere in the stabilized Soviets, and had full buying power; prices being generally slightly lower than in the White districts.

The Insurrectionist

P. 22 line 3 - P. 24 line 6

During 1928, 1926, and 1927, the Northern Expedition was carried out, with Chiang Kai-shek as Commander-in Chief, selected jointly by the Kuomintang and the Communists. Chou En-lai was ordered to prepare an insurrection and help the Nationalist Army seize Shanghai. A youth of twenty-eight, with no formal military training, little experience with the working class (from which as son of a big bourgeois family, he had been isolated), with no guidebook to show him how to make an insurrection, and none to advise him (the chief Russian advisers being with Chiang Kai-shek), Chou arrived in Shanghai equipped only with a revolutionary determination and a strong theoretical knowledge of Marxism.

Within three months the Communist Party had organized 600,000 workers, and was able to call a general strike. The response was unanimous, and a terrifying experience to the snug populace of this greatest stronghold of foreign imperialism in China. But the insurrection failed to materialize. Unarmed and untrained, the workers did not know how to go about "seizing the city." They had to learn empirically the necessity of an armed nucleus of workers. And the militarists accommodated them.

Underestimating the significance of the first and then of a second strike, the old northern warlords merely cut off a number of heads, but failed to halt the labour movement. Chou En-lai and the famous Shanghai labour leaders, Chao Tse-yen, Ku Shen-chang, and I Yi-ming, now succeeded in organizing 50,000 pickets, and in the

French concession secured premises where military training was secretly given to 2,000 cadets. With weapons smuggled into the city, an "iron band" of 300 workmen was trained, and this was the only armed force these Shanghai workers had.

On March 21, 1927, the Communists called a general strike which closed all the industries of Shanghai, and put 600,000 workers, organized and militant for the first time in their lives, behind the barricades of revolution. They seized first the police stations, next the arsenal, then the garrison, and after that, victory. Five thousand workers were armed, six battalions of revolutionary troops created, and a "citizens' government" was proclaimed.

It was the most remarkable coup d'état in modern Chinese history.

Thus it happened that Chiang Kai-shek, arriving a few days later at the outskirts of Shanghai, found his battle already won, and was able to enter the Chinese city¹ and accept power from a triumphant workers' army. And thus it happened that when, about a month later, Chiang Kai-shek staged his own Right coup d'état, and the killing of radicals began, first on his list of condemned was this dangerous youth who had given him his victory--but who, the Generalissimo realized, might also take it away from him. And thus also began Chou En-lai's life as a fugitive from the Kuomintang, and as a leader of the Third Revolution, the revolution that raised the Red banner in China.

Chao Tse-yen, Yu Shun-chang, Lo Vi-ming, and Ch'ien Yen-nien (son of Ch'ien Tu-hsiu, a founder of the Communist Party of China, and now imprisoned at Nanking), and dozens more of Chou En-lai's close co-workers in the Shanghai uprising, were seized and executed. The toll of the "Shanghai massacre" is estimated at 5,000 lives. Chou En-lai himself was captured by Chiang Kai-shek's Second Division, and General Pai Chung-hsi (now ruler of Kiangsi) issued an order for his execution. But the brother of the division commander had been Chou's student at Wharpoon, and he helped Chou to escape.

The Insurrectionist fled to Wuhan, then to Nanchang, where he helped organize the famous August First Uprising, the historical beginning of the Red Army of China. Next he went to Swatow, where Red workers seized the great seaport of South China, and under Chou En-lai held it for ten days against assaults from both foreign gunboats and the native troops of militarists; and then on to Canton, and the organization of the famous Canton Commune.

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CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by Edgar Snow, consisting of 307 pages, entitled "Red Star over China" and issued on Dec. 20, 1946, is a book which I translated and which I had published by EIBI Publishing Co.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 10 day of April, 1947

EIBI Publishing Co.

USAMI Seijiro

/s/ SUGIMOTO Toshiro (seal)
USAMI, Seijiro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on the same date

Witness: /s/ OKADA Shigemasa

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中口ノ赤イ星（上）

エドガー、スノウ著
宇佐美誠次郎、杉本俊朗共訳

◎三〇五頁七行目……三〇六頁十行目

エドガー、スノウハ一九〇五年七月米國ミズリイ州カンサス、シテイニ
生レ、ソノ家系ハアイルランド及ビ英國系デアル少年時代ニハ農業勞働
ニ従事シタリ鐵道ノ油差ナリ又印刷術ヲ學ンダ由デ一九二三年―二四
年ニハカンサス、シテイノ、ジュニア―、カレッツデニ學ビ次イデ一九二
五年―二六年ミズリイ大學一九二七年コロンビア大學（エクステンシヨ
ン）ニ學ンダ彼ノ新聞記者トシテノ第一歩ハカンサス、シテイ、スタア
ズニ始マルガ一九二九年―三〇年ニハチャイナ、ウイークリイ、レヴュ
（密勤氏評論）ノアシスタント、エディタアトシテ活躍シ次イデ彼ノ極
大特派員トシテノ多彩ナ活動ガ始マツタ一九三〇年以後スノウハ中國本
部ノ外、東三省、蒙古、日本、朝鮮、臺灣、酋領東印度、緬甸、印度ヲ
訪レテ居ル、即チ一九三〇年ニハ西南各省ヲ長期ニ亙ツテ遊歴シ雲南省
西部ヨリ緬甸ニ至リ一九三一年ノ緬甸ノ叛亂ノ時ニハ同地ニ在ツタソノ

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中門ノ赤イ星（上）

エドガー、スノウ 著
宇佐美誠次郎、杉本俊朗共訳

◎三〇五頁七行目……三〇六頁十行目

エドガー、スノウハ一九〇五年七月米国ミズリイ州カンサス、シテイニ
生レ、ソノ家系ハアイルランド及ビ英國系デアル少年時代ニハ農業勞働
ニ従事シクリン道ノ油差ナリ又印刷術ヲ學ンダ由デ一九二三年―二四
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（密勤氏評論）ノアシスタント、エディタアトシテ活躍シ次イデ彼ノ極
東特派員トシテノ多彩ナ活動ガ始マツク一九三〇年以後スノウハ中國本
部ノ外、東三省、蒙古、日本、朝鮮、臺灣、西領東印度、緬甸、印度ヲ
訪レテ居ル、即チ一九三〇年ニハ西南各省ヲ長期ニ亙ツテ遊歴シ雲南省
西部ヨリ緬甸ニ至リ一九三一年ノ緬甸ノ叛亂ノ時ニハ同地ニ在ツタソノ

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後緬甸ヨリ印度ニ入り印度革命ノ領袖ト會見シテ居ル九、一八事變ノ
勃發ト共ニ彼ハ中ニ歸來シ日本ノ中國侵略狀況ヲ觀察シ一九三二年
ノ上海戦争一九三三年ノ熱河戦争ニ際シテモ幾多ノ通信ヲ現地ヨリ米
英ノ各紙ヘ送ツクノデアル

此ノ間一九三四年―三五年ニハ北京ノ燕京大學ノ講師ノ任ニアツクガ
イカナル職務ヲ擔當シテ居タカ明カデナイ。

其ノ後スノウノ活動ハ本書ノ物語ル通りデ一九三六年六月外ハ人トシ
テハジメテ北ノソヴィエト區ニ入り詳サニ觀察、調査ヲ重ネ、北平
ニツク。滿洲國ニ侵襲時ニハ北平ニアツク直チニ上海ニ移リ通信
活動ヲ續ケタヘコノ間ノ事情ハ彼ノ著書「アジアノ爲ノ闘争」ニ述ベ
ラレテ居ル。次イデ彼ハ武漢攻陥ニ赴キソノ結果トシテ一九四一年「
アジアノ爲ノ闘争」ヲ發表サレタ同年彼ハ米國ニ歸リ第二次世界戦争
中ニハソヴィエトト同盟ヲ訪レソコニ於クル見聞ハ「ソヴィエト勢力
ノ興隆」ヘ一九四五年ヲ通シテ我々ニ傳ヘラレテ居ル

◎一〇五頁十一行目一〇七頁末行目

共產黨ノ基本的政策

今日ノ中国共產黨ノ基本的政策ハ何デアラウカコノ問題ニツイテ私ハ毛澤東ソノ他ノ共產黨領袖ト十數回ニ亙リ話し合ツタケレドモ私達ガコレヲノ政策ヲ檢討スル前ニ共產黨ト南京政府トノ長門ノ國華ノ性質ニツイテ、或ル點念ヲ持ツコトガ必要デアル若シ私達ガ紅化シツツアル西北ノ最近ノ出來事ヲ理解シヨウトスルダケデモ私達ハ先ヅ第一ニ若干ノ歴史的事實ヲ顧ミトケレバナラナイ

次ノ各節デ私ハ延安デ會見シタ共產黨中央委員會ノ若イアメリカ代表者ヲ受クク點點達^コテ^フ私ノ流布デ傳習スルソレハ頃ハセイコトダガ、ソレダケノ値打ノアルコトガ判ルダラウト思フ周知ノニダガ中國共產黨ハヤット一九二二年ニ創立サレタ

ソレハ國民黨ノ創立者孫逸仙ガソヴィエト、ロシアト有名ナ協定ヲ行ツター一九二三年迄非常ニ急進ニ生長シタ國民黨共產黨共ニ協力ヲ持タ

copy 10-10-15

ズ、兩者ハ民主主義ヲ確立スルタメニ闘争シテ居ルノダト主張シタ。
諒解ニ到達スルノハ容易デアツタ。一九二四年ロシア人顧問ノ援助デ
人民黨ハレーニンノ爲メ方針ニ則ツテ改組サレタ、中ニ共產黨トノ聯
盟ガ結成サレ共產黨員ハ腐敗セル北京政權ヲ打倒シタ一九二五年一
九二七年ノ大革命ノ指導組織ニ非常ト活躍ヲ示シタサテ共產黨員ニ門
スルカギリ、コノ合作ノ基礎ハ孫逸仙ト人民黨ガ二ツノ主要ト革命的
原則ヲ承認シタコトニアルト概括出來ル第一ノ原則ハ反帝國主義政策
一革命的行動ニ依ル完全ナ政治的、領土的、經濟的主權ノ回復一ノ必
要ヲ認メタ第二ノ原則ハ反封建主義ト反軍閥主義一地主、軍閥ニ向ク
ラレル民主主義革命ノ實現、社會、經濟政治生活ノ新ラシイ形態ノ建
設ソレハ性質上民主主義的タラネバナラマコトニ兩者ノ意見ハ一致シ
テ居ターノ中内政策ヲ要求シタ。
勿論共產黨員ハ此ニ確立サレルデアラウ社會主義社會ニ對スル必然的
前提條件トシテ「ブルジョア民主主義」革命ノ成功的ト完遂ヲ認メタ

ノデ、カレラノ立場ハ「民主主義的民族的獨立ト解放」運動ヲ援助
 スル點デ首尾一貫シテ居ク不幸ニモ孫逸仙ハ革命ガ完成サレル前ニ
 一九二五年逝去シク國民黨ト共產黨トノ合作ハ一九二七年終ニ
 デタ共產黨側ノ見解カラハ「民革命ハコレデ終ツクト云ヘヨウ、新
 國民黨ニ支配サレ一部ノ列強、開港場ノ銀行家地主ニ援助サレク
 國民黨右派ハ合法的ニ選出サレタ武漢政府カラ離脱シク同派ハ蔣介
 石ヲ上ニ戴キ南京ニ政權ヲ樹立シクガ共產黨員ト國民黨員ノ大部分
 ハ當時コレヲ「反革命的」即チ「ブルジョア民主主義革命」自体ニ
 反スルモノト認メタ。

國民黨ハ直チニ南京ノクーデタート和解シクガコノタメ共產主義ハ
 死刑ニ處セラルベキ罪トナツタ共產黨員ガ民族主義ノ二ツノ重要ナ
 ル點「反帝國主義運動ト民主主義革命ト考ヘタモノハ實際ト放棄サ
 レタ點イテ質問ノ内口トハニハ鋒起スル農業革命ニ對スルハゲシイ
 追求ガ起ツタ數千ノ共產黨員、従前ノ農民組合労働運動指導者ガ殺

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サレ組合ハ彈壓サレタ「開明的獨裁政權」ハアラユル形態ノ反對勢
力ニ對シ武力ヲ用ヒタソレニモカカハラズカナリノ故ノ共產黨員ガ
軍ノ中ニ生き残り當ハ大テロリズムノ期同ヲ經ジテ維持サレタ共產
黨員ニ對スル内戰ニ數十億元支出サレタニモカカハラズ一九三七年
紅軍ハ西北ニソノ完全ト支配力ヲ及ボシ得ル廣大ト領域ヲ獲得シタ
勿論共產黨員ハ一九二七年以來ノ十年間ノ歴史ガ民族獨立ト民主主
義「國民黨モソレヲ目的トシタガ」ハ計外的ニハ反帝「主義政策計
內的ニハ農業革命ヲウシテハ中國ニ於テ成就サレ得ナイト云フ彼等
ノ宣言ヲ充分ニ確認シタト信ジテ居ル。

一一〇頁一行目―九行目

毛澤東ハ一九二八年ノ國民黨農民委員會書記トシテハ、共產黨トノ分裂以前
毛ガ國民黨中央執行委員候補デアツタ當時ニ二丁一省ノ縣城ノ土地統計ノ
資料ヲ整理シタ・コレハコノ調査ハ在郷地主・富農・官吏・不在地主・高
利貸等全農村人口ノ約十パーセントガ中國全耕地ノ七十パーセント以上ヲ所有シテ居ルコトヲ
示シタト斷言シタ。約十五パーセントハ中農ノ所有デアル・然ルニ貧農・小作人
雇農・リ成ル・農村人口ノ六十五パーセント以上ハ全耕地ノ十パーセントヲ所有スルニ過ギ
ナシタ。

毛ニコレハ「コレラノ統計ハ反革命ノ後ニ發表ヲ禁ムラレテシマツター
「十年後ノ現在。中國ノ土地所有分布ニツイテ。南京カラ何等ノ發表ヲ
出ルコトハ出来ズ未ダ不可説ダ」

共產黨員ハコノ農村調査カ今日ノ大部分ノ中國人ニハ「抗日闘争ヲ意味ス
ル反帝國主義闘争」ニシテ結果ニ「テ促進サレタト考ヘテ居ル
「一一頁十行目―一二頁五行目

勿論紅軍ガ政府ヲ武力ニ「ツテ打倒スル企圖ヲ持テ續ケル限り南京ハ内政

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ヲ中止スルコトハ出来ナシタ。併シ早クモ一九三二年ニ紅軍ハ四年ヲ從
業シ抗日トイフ共通ノ綱領ヲ南京トノ聯合ヲ提案シタ、ソノ提案ハ拒絕サ
レタ、紅軍ハ今ヤ西北ニ於テ戰略的優位ノ地位ヲ占メソノ勢ハ益々發展シ
テ、ソノアルガ侵略者ニ對スル全國的「抗日戰線」ヲ結成スルタメニハ内戰ヲ
停止シ全國ノ抗日軍・愛國團體ト協力スル所意アリト提案シタ、コノ提
案ニ於テ共產黨ハ南京ガ民主主義的代議政府ヲ確立シ日本ト抗戰シ人民ニ
參政權ヲアタヘ、人民大眾ニ市民的ナ自由ヲ保障シサヘスレハ紅軍トソウ
イエト地重トハ之ヲ中央政府ノ完全ナ主權下ニオクセノデアルト約束シテ
居ル、イビ換ヘレハ共產黨ハ國民黨ガ反帝國主義反封建主義ノブルジョア
「民族主義」的綱領ニ復歸スルナラバ國民黨ト何時デモ「再婚」スル用意
アルコトヲ聲明シクノデアル、而シテコノ基本的目標ノウチ民族的生存權
ノタメノ國爭ノ方ガ重要デアリ土地問題ニ關スル國內國爭ノ方ハ之ヲ及
シテハ所行スベキダト共產黨ハ主張シタ、即チ階級的敵對關係ノ解決ハ日
本トノ對外的敵對關係ノ解決ヲクシテハ期待シ難シ又コノタメノ國爭ノ
内ニ昇進スベキデアルト考ヘタ。

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一 一 國 實 行 目 一 末 行 目

私ハ毛ニソグイエトハ不平等條約ノ商發ニ實成カドウメト實ネタ・コレハ
コレラ不平等條約ノ多クハスデニ日本ニ・リ時ニ而加事ニ於テ獎勵サレ
テ后ルト増殖シタ・ソシテ中國代議政府將來ノ恩愛ニツイテハカレハ次ノ
マウニ説トシタ「友好列強ト中國トハ平和親善ニ相互利益ノ條約ヲ商議スル
ノデアラウ・ソノ他ノ列強トモ中國ハ廣汎ヲ協力ヲ維持スル用意ガアル・
併シ日本ニ對スル限リデハ中國ハ解放戰ノ行動ヲ通ジテスベテノ不平等條
約ヲ破棄シテアラニル日本帝國主義者ノ財産ヲ沒收シ日本ノ特殊權益・地
界・及ビ中國内ニ於ケルソノ力ヲ統制シ一ケレハアラナイ・ソノ他列強ト
ノ關係ニ於テハ我々共産主義者ハ日本帝國主義ニ對スル鬥争ニ於テ中國ノ
世界自地位ヲ不利益トアルツグナ如何ナル措置ヲモ維護シナイ

一 一 七 頁 下 三 行 目 一 一 八 頁 上 行 目

日本ニ對スル共產黨ノ政策如何トノ私ノ質問ニ毛澤東ハ答ヘ始メタガ私ノ
質問通りデアル「若シ日本ガ敗北シ中國カラ追ビ拂ハレルナラハ「外國帝
國主義」ノ大問題ハ中國ニ於テ一般的解決ヲ要ラレルダラヴトオ考ヘデス
ス」

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ヲ中止スルコトハ出来ナキヲ。併シ早クモ一九三二年ニ紅軍ハ和平ヲ提
案シ抗日トイフ共通ノ綱領ヲ南京トノ聯合ヲ提案シタ、ソノ提案ハ拒絕サ
レタ、紅軍ハ今ヤ西北ニ於テ戰略的優位ノ地位ヲ占メソノ勢ハ益々發展シ
。ソアルガ侵略者ニ對スル全國的「抗日戰線」ヲ形成スルタメニハ内戰ヲ
停止シ全中國ノ抗日軍、愛國團體ト爲カスル用意アリト提案シタ、コノ提
案ニ於テ共產黨ハ南京ガ民主主義的代議政府ヲ確立シ日本ト抗戦シ人民ニ
参政權ヲアタヘ、人民大衆ニ市民的ナ自由ヲ保障シサヘスレハ紅軍トソウ
イエト地議トハ之ヲ中央政府ノ完全ナ主權下ニオクモノデアルト約束シテ
居ル、イビ換ヘレハ共產黨ハ國民黨ガ反帝國主義反封建主義ノブルジョア
「民族主義」的綱領ニ復歸スルナラバ國民黨ト何時デモ「再婚」スル用意
アルコトヲ聲明シタノデアル、而シテコノ基本的目標ノウチ民族的存在權
ノタメノ國爭ノ方ガ重要デアリ土地問題ニ關スル國內國爭ノ方ハ之ヲ急務
シテ進行スベキダト共產黨ハ主張シタ、即チ階級的敵對關係ノ解決ハ日
本トノ對外的敵對關係ノ解決ナクシテハ期待シ難シ又コノタメノ國爭ノ
内ニ昇降スベキデアルト考ヘタ。

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◎一二四頁八行目——一二五頁九行目

質問「カウイフ戦争ニ参加スルニハドウスレバ人民ノ武装組織、訓練ガ

ウマク行クデヤウカ」

返答「人民ハ自己ヲ組織シ、武装スル權利ヲアダヘラレナケレバナリマ
セン、コレハ過去ニ蔣介石ガ人民ニアダヘナカツタ自由デス。昨シ年
ラコノ抑圧モ何ヘノ組織ノ命令ノヤウニ完全ニハ成功シマセンデシタ
マ北京上海ソノ他各地ノ若輩ナリ。組織ニモ物ラス學生連ハ自分連ヲ組
織シ、能ニ政治的ニ準備ヲ了シマシタ。ケレドモ學生連ト軍
隊ノ反目大衆ハ宗教ニ自由ノ運動モ、訓練、武装ノ許可モアダヘ
ラレテ居マセン之ニ反シテ大衆ガ経済的、社会的、政治的自ラアダ
ヘレラナラバ、カレラノ力ハ欲言倍モ強化サレ、民族ノ統一力ガ發

キルテセウ

「軍ハ戦争ヲ避シテ軍閥ヨリ自由ヲ圖ニ取リ確乎タル勢力ヲ布置シ
テス。抗日義勇軍ハ日本ノ壓制者カラ行動ノ自由ヲ圖ヒトリ同シ
ニシテ自ラ武装シタノデス。モシ中國人民ガ訓練、武装、組織ニ

10/15 #/015

成めスルナラバカレラモ同義ニ義敵ノカトナルコトが出来マス」
「貴方ノ御意見デハコノ『解放戦争』ニ採用サルベキ戦略、戦術ノ主
要點ハ何デセウカ」
「第一ハ解放戦リナイ戦術ノ所ナシ遊撃戦デセウ、ソノ目的ハ行動自
由ナル由地ニ於ケル高層ノ居住ニ依存シ、急襲ト急退、迅速ナ集中ト
分散ヲ特徴トスル戦術デス、ソレハ所ナシ重兵、緩行ハ戦術ニ制約サレ
ルモノデスガ遊撃戦ヲ合ズルノデス」
「コレハ必ズシモ重要ナ戦術的地點ノ放棄ヲ意味スルノデハアタソレガ
有利デアル限リ陣地戰ノ防衛モ必要デス。併シ中心の戦行ハ遊撃戦デ
リジト戦術ヲ主トシナケレバナリマセン、盛昌戰ヲ利用サレナケレバナ
リマセンガソレハ戦術上ハ補助的ナ二次的ナモノデセウ」
◎一二六頁十三行目——一二七頁三行目

中國正規軍ノ外ニ私造ハ多数ノ遊撃隊ト別動隊ヲ農民ノ間ニ作り出シ之ヲ
指導シ、政治的、軍事的ニ充分訓練ヲアタヘナケレバナリマセン。滿洲デ
コノ種ノ抗日義勇軍ガナシ遂ケタ成績ハ全中國ノ革命的農民カラ動員出来

ル實在的抵抗カノ想ヲテ小サナ聲明ニ過ギマセン。適當ニ指導シ組織スレバ
カウイワ部隊ハ日本人ヲ一日二十四時間并命ニ殺レサセ、死ヌマテ傷マス
コトガ出来マス。

「忘レテナライノハ戦争ガ中国内テ行ハレルト云フコトデス。日本人
ハ故意アルモ中国人民ニ完全ニトリ奉カレテシマフダラウトワリケデス
日本人ハスベテ總線ト共ニ移動シナケレバナラヌシ、ソレヲ守固シアラ
ユル要隘ニ沿ツテ軍隊ヲ配置シ滿洲ト日本内地ヲ保護ニ守固シナケレ
バナラヌデセウ

③ 一三四頁十三行目——一三五頁十行目

紅大ノ各都ノ題目ハソレゾレ違ツテ居タガ第一部ノ候補生ノソレハ見ホト
シテ考ヘテヨカラウ、政治講座ハ次ノキウナ課程ヲ含ンデ居ル。政治知識
、中國革命ノ諸問題、經濟學、黨建設、共和國ノ行政的諸問題、レーニン
主義ト民主主義ノ歴史的基礎、日本ノ政治的勢力、軍事課程ハ對日戦争ニ
於ケル戦術ノ諸問題（日本ニ對スル一奇襲戰、抗日戦争ニ於ケル遊撃戰ノ
發展ヲ含ンデ居タ。特別ノ教科書ガ以上ノ課程ノ或ルモノニハ用意サレテ

10/16 #1115

居タ或ルモノハ明カニ江西ノソヴィエト印刷局カラ持ツテ来タモノデソコテ
ハ八百人以上ノ印刷工ガ工場デ使ハレテ居タトノコトデアル但ノ課程デ使ハ
レタ教師ハ紅軍指揮官ト黨領袖ノ講演テソレラハロシア及ビ中國革命ノ歴史
的經驗ヲ概ヒ或ハ一收シタ政府ノ文書、記録、統計等ノ資料ヲ利用シタモ
ノダツタ。

コレラノ紅大ノ關係ハ悉ラク「紅軍ハ實際日本トダカハウトシテ居ルノダ
ラウカ」トイフ機關ニ對スル回答ヲ示唆スルデアラウ。如何ニ紅軍ガ組織シ
テ居リ中國ノ日本ニ對スル「獨立戦争」ヲ熱心ニ計畫シテ居ルカラ示スニハ
以上ニ充分デアル、何等カノ奇想ニヨツテ日本ガ現在ソノ軍事のジヤガノ
トノ軍備ノ下ニ蹂躪セル中國ノ廣大ナ地域カラ撤兵シナイ限りコノ戦争ハ不
可避デアルトカレラハ考ヘテ居ルノデアアル

◎一三六頁六行目——九行目

第五章 赤い劇場

4 私ヲ赤い劇場ニ誘ツテクレタ若イ官吏ト一諸ニ私ガ出掛ケタ時ニハ人々ハ既
ニ古イオ寺ヲ利用シテ間ニ合セニ作ツタ野外舞臺ノ方ヘ下リテ行ツタ。ソノ

コノ第一ノ山ハ、物ハ、愛路トイフ外ニ、ガツタ、三居ハ、一九三一年ノ朝鮮第一村
◎第一三頁十五行目——三頁二行目
ツラニ居タ。モシツタモ、ナチナ、又、反、生、モ、ク、料、機、ツラ、居、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
スルヤ、コト、ハ、ナ、ケ、レ、タ、モ、リ、ハ、打、中、ク、料、機、ツラ、居、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
原、ル、テ、ツ、リ、ナ、ハ、ハ、リ、カ、リ、テ、リ、テ、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
ニ、ヨ、ル、シ、リ、ナ、ハ、ハ、リ、カ、リ、テ、リ、テ、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
日、又、ハ、リ、ナ、ハ、ハ、リ、カ、リ、テ、リ、テ、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
ソ、レ、ハ、一、ツ、タ、モ、リ、ハ、ハ、リ、カ、リ、テ、リ、テ、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
イ、テ、ア、ツ、タ、モ、リ、ハ、ハ、リ、カ、リ、テ、リ、テ、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
大、教、育、ノ、タ、メ、ニ、長、シ、ラ、ハ、ハ、リ、カ、リ、テ、リ、テ、ル、ト、云、長、所、特
一、三、七、二、行、目——八、行、目
◎一、三、七、二、行、目——八、行、目
人ハ、全、山、土、日、テ、ハ、日、三、時、カ、ト、チ、ツ、カ、

16 昭和六年六月

落テ開テシ、日本人ガヤツテ來テ「無抵抗」ノ中國兵ヲ退却フ、第二場テハ
ハ日本ノ將校ガ居民ノ家テ宴會ヲ圖キ、中國人ヲ弟子ノ代リニ使ヒ、辭バ
ラツテ對女ヲ口説ク他ノ場面テハ日本人ノ「無抵抗」行前カニハシムヤヘロイ
ンヲ賣リ國民ニ一包ヲ買フヤウニ思イル、買フノヲ拒絶シタ一青年ハ引ッ
張リ出サレテ殺害サレル。

「オ前ハナルヒスヲ買ハナイノカ、オ前ハ海關ノ衛生監視ニ従ハナイノ
カ、オ前ハ「無抵抗」皇帝溥儀ヲ敬愛シナイノカ」ト責メ立テル「オ前ハ怪
シカラヌ、オ前ハ抗日匪賊ダ」ソシテ青年ハ忽チ首ヲ斬ラレテシマフ。

村ノ市場ノ場面テハ小商人達ガ平穩ニ商品ヲ賣ツテ居ル、突然、日本ノ
兵隊ガヤツテ來テ「抗日匪賊」ヲ捉テスル直チニカレラハ「護照」ヲ出セト云
セト云フ、忘レタ者ハ射殺サレル、ソレカラ二人ノ日本將校ガ行商ノ「豚肉」
ヲゴツガツ喰ツテシマフカレガ代金ヲ請求スルト彼等ハオドメテ行商人ヲ
呪ミツケル「オ前ハ代金ヲヨコセト云フノカ、何ダ蔭介石ハ一錢モ呉レト
ハ云ハズニ滿洲、熱河、察哈爾、塘沽協定、何、海津協定、翼察委員會ヲ
ヨコシタジヤナイカ、ソレナニオ前ハチヨッピリノ豚肉ノ金ヲ拂ヘト云

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フノカ」ソレカラ彼等ハ行商ヲ「匪徒」トシテ刺シ殺シタ。勿論最後ニハ
スベテコレ等ノ事ハ糾弾ニトツテ堪ヘラレナクナル、商人ハソノ憂ヲ念
ヲヒツクリ返シ、農民ハ槍ヲ持ツテ出シ、女子供ハ刃物ヲ持ツテヤツ
テ來テ皆ガ「日本鬼」ニ對シテ「死ママデ闘フ」ト云フ。

コノ小サナ芝居ニハユ一モアト土氣が入ツテヤル。太キテ笑ヒ聲ト日本
人ニ對スル蔑視トヤシミノ惡トガ入り交ル。觀客ハ皆ニ感動サレル。
ソレハカレラニトツテハ政治的宣傳ソノモノデハナクシタテタ熱劇デモナ
ク、まじイ實事ソノモノデアル。非徒ガ大部分十代デ、或ハト山西迄レデ
アルトイフ事ハ凡そが實事ノ中ノ事ニ似入シテヤルノデ、全く忘レラレ
テヤルヤウデアツタ。

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◎二八九頁三行目

八行目

「中國工農蘇維埃政府國立銀行」ノ字ヲ入レタ南方ノ貨幣ハ良質ノ用紙ニキレイニ印刷サレテ居タ。西北ニ於テハ技術的困難ノタメニ、貧弱ノ紙ニ時ニハ布ニ粗末ニ印刷チシタモノデアツタ、カレラノスローガンハスベテノ貨幣ノ上ニ見ラレタ陝西省デ發行サレタ紙幣ニハ「内戰ヲ停止セヨ」「抗日ニ一致セヨ」「中國革命萬歲」トイフヤウナ標語ガ附セラレテ居タ、ソヴィエトノ貨幣ハ安定シタソヴィエト内デハ、殆んど到ル所デ受取ラレ、完全ニ購買力ヲ持チ、相場ハ一般ニ白色地區ヨリ極ク値カ低カツタ。

◎七二頁三行目——七四頁六行目

一九二五年一九二六年一九二七年ノ間ニ國民黨ト共產黨トノ聯合推恩ニヨリ蔣介石ハ總司令官トナリ北伐ガ進行シタ。周恩來ハ異動ノ準備チシ國民黨ガ上海ヲ占領スルノヲ援助スルヤウ命セラレタ。正式ノ軍事訓練モ受ケズ暴動運動ノ訓練モ少ク（大ブルジョア家族ノ子弟トシテカレハ暴動階級カラ孤立シテ居ター）如何ニ暴動チヤルカ教ルル事内書モ持タベ

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助言者モ持タズハ此ヲロシア人ノ関心ハ蔣介石ニ同シタリ二十八日ノ青島
開ハ革命的決意ヲ強力ナルクシズムノ理論的知識ヲ武裝シタケテ上海ニ
到達シタリ

三月月ノ程ニ共產黨ハ六十万人ノ勞働者ヲ組織シ總罷業ヲ命ズル事ガ出来ル
ヤウニナツタリ。蔣ハ此ヲ畏レテ中絶ニ於ケル。帝國主義最大ノ根柢
點トシテ安易ヲ募リ食ツテ居タリ此ノ點ノ住民ニトツテハ恐ルベキ危險デアツ
タ、ガガ異動ハ實現セズニ失敗シタリ、武裝モヨク訓練モ受ケズ勞働者道ハ、
一都市ヲ占領セルニハドウシテイイカクカワタリ。蔣ハ此ヲソレヲ軍閥
勞働者ノ武裝セル中核體ノ必要ヲ具バネバヨリカワタリ。ソシテソレヲ軍閥

主義者ガ彼等ニ提供シタリ。

第二次及ビ第三次ノ罷業ノ意義ヲ多少評價シテ様式ヲ北洋軍閥ハ單ニ數多ノ
所首ヲ行ツタケテ勞働運動自身ノ阻止ハ出来カワタリ、周恩來ト有名ト上
海ノ勞働指導者趙士炎、顧順章、羅亦農ハ今ヤ五萬人ノ糾結時ノ組織ニ成功
シフラスノ世界ヲ建樹シモ入レ、ソコデ二千ノ幹部ニ對シテ秘密裡ニ軍閥
訓練ヲ行ツタリ、上海ニ密移入サレタモ一億餘第三百人ノ狙撃者ノ一鐵門ニ

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ガ開サレタ。コレガ上海の情勢ヲ示ツタ。一ノ武力デアツタ。
一九二七年三月二十一日共産黨ハ上海ニ革命ヲ命ジタ。上海ノ全工業ハ停止ノカ
初メテ組織ト門閥トニ基キタ。六十萬ノ勞働者ハ革命ノバリケードニ昇
シタ。カレラハ先ヅ警察ヲ次ニ兵隊、然後ハ占領シ新クテ勝利ヲ見
タ。五千ノ勞働者ガ武器ヲ持テ、上海ノ革命軍ハ人民政府ニ
言サレタ。ソレハ近代中國史上、最も注目スベキク、デターデアツタ。
數日上海ノ近郊ニ到リシ蔣介石ハ戰鬥ガ任ニ勝利ヲオサセタ。寧ろ見シ
中國人區(註)ニ入地際ヲ誇ツカ勞働者軍力ヲ受ケルコトガ出来タ
所ガハカラズモ一箇月餘ニハ蔣介石ガカレ自身ノ右翼カ、デターチ行シ、
急進派ノ殺戮ヲハジメタ。ソノ時ノ有名人蔣ハ彼ニ勝利ヲ與ヘハシタガ
彼カラ其ノ勝利ヲ奪カカモ知レナイ此ノ危險ヲ寄任デアツタ。此ノ時以來
民衆七合ヲシテノ困窮ヲ生活ガ於マリヤガテ中國ニ紅旗ヲ掲ゲル爲三草
命指導者トシテノ彼ノ生活ガ於マツタ。
註 勿論外國列國ハ攻撃サレオカッタ、國民軍ハ上海ノ中國人區ヲ占領シ

タケケツク
趙士炎、自陳、維大員、隨廷臣（中國共産黨ノ創立者）現在南京ヲ殺滅シ
レテ片ル國勢ノ息子ニ並ニ上海島中ヲ包圍ス。寧波ニ陷リソク兵數十萬人
ガ持ヘラレテ處刑サレタ。上海處殺」ノ代償ハ五千人ノ生命ト推定サレテ居
ル。自陳喪モ現今石ノ所ノタニ捕ハラレ白崇禧將軍（現在江西官主席）
ニコリ死刑ノ宣告サ下サレタ、トコロガ偶々所長ノ弟方雲培ニ於ケル間ノ生
生クツクノデ固ハ逃亡セルコトガ出来タ、コノ是自願助老ハ武漢ニ逃ガレた
昌ニ逃ゲソコデ中國紅軍ノ兵勇の發見ナル、有名イ八・一暴動ノ後助
シク、次ニ彼ハ汕頭へ行ツタガ、ソコデハ共產派ノ勞働者が華南ノ大海港ヲ
占領シ周恩來ノ指導下ニ外國ノ砲艦ト軍閥ノ土著軍隊方ノ攻撃ニ對シテ十日
間頑張ツタ、ソレカラ彼ハ廣州へ行き有名イ廣州コミューンノ組織ヲ行ツ

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文會成立ニ因スル證明書

(四)

本書ニ添付セラレタル日本語ニテ書カレ三〇七頁ヨリ成ルエドガー、ス
ノウ著中譯の赤い星ト題スル昭和二十一年十二月二十日發行ノ書籍ハ自
分ガ翻譯シ永美書房ヲシテ發行ヒシメタル書籍ノ一ナルコトヲ證明ス
昭和二十二年四月十日 於東京

永美書房
宇佐美 誠次郎
杉本 俊明

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テ爲サレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日 於 同 所

立會人 岡田 茂 正

文書ノ成立ニ關スル證明書

本書ニ添付セル日本語ニテ書カレタル三〇七頁ヨリ成ルエドガースノ
ウヰ字佐美誠次郎、杉本俊朗共譯中口の赤い星ト題スル書籍ハ昭和二
十一年十二月廿日永美書房ニ於テ發行シタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年四月四日 於東京

永美書房

代表者 花 村 仁八郎

右署名捺印ハ自分ノ面前ニ於テナサレタルモノナルコトヲ證明ス

同日 於 同 所

立合人 岡 田 茂 正